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Continued downsizing efforts have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on
Department of Defense budgetary resources. Program and activity managers are expected
to justify their budgets based on well-defined quantitative measures of performance,
activity level and readiness. This thesis examines the resources-to-readiness issues in
DoD, specifically focusing on Marine Corps Operating Forces. Additionally, this thesis
evaluates the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC)
program as a mechanism for analyzing detailed operating and support cost data in order
to relate resources to readiness.
DoD's VAMOSC program as a whole as well as the individual Service's VAMOSC
systems are described. The Marine Operating and Support Information System (MOSIS),
which incorporates Marine ground combat systems into Navy VAMOSC, is evaluated
with regards to its contribution to cost analysis. Currently, the MOSIS database is limited
in the number of weapon systems on which it collects data and the O&S cost categories it
covers. In addition, it lacks critical operating tempo data needed to conduct useful cost
analysis. This makes it extremely difficult to currently develop cost factors that can be
effective in the formulation and justification of budgets. Ongoing efforts to expand
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1 . Budget Environment
In response to recent downsizing efforts Congress has
imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on the
Department of Defense (DoD) budgetary resources. Since 1986
there continues to be a real decline in defense spending.
In real terms, the FY 98 Budget is 3 6 percent below that of
FY 85, the peak year for DoD budget authority since the
Korean War (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997) . Competition
for scarce monetary resources within DoD has necessitated
that programs and activity managers better justify their
budget requests. They will no longer be able to use
qualitative measurements as the sole justification for their
programs
.
Budget analysts at DoD and the Department of the Navy
(DoN) prefer to see quantitative performance measures that
will help them better understand budget level changes. As
an example, the Navy uses steaming days as a performance
measure for justification of their budget requests for
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. Currently, the
performance measures used by Marine Corps budget analysts to
justify O&M funding for Marine Operating Forces are
inadequate. A simpler, more accurate quantitative
measurement is desired that will assist budget analysts in
better explaining budget level changes. (Busick, 1997)
In the past. Marine Corps budget analysts used
Battalion Field Training Days (BFTDs) as performance
criteria in their budget submissions^ . BFTDs are collected
from the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) by the Training and
Education Division, Marine Corps Combat and Development
Command (MCCDC) and used in readiness and sustainability
formats submitted with the Program Objectives Memorandum
(POM) . Additionally, the SECDEF is required by law to
report to Congress recommendations for the number of field
training days for combat arms battalions of the Marine Corps
(Jareb, 1994) . While BFTDs are a basic measure of a combat
arms unit's activity some have attempted to use them as
measures of operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and readiness.
A field training day is a period of time of at least 8 hours and not more than
24 hours where training is conducted in the furtherance of the unit's mission
The Marine Corps states that BFTDs are a measure of
activity rather than a measure of unit training readiness.
A study conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
(Jareb, 1994) on Marine Corps Ground Training Readiness
noted three major criticisms of BFTDs
:
• They do not account for the quality of training.
• They do not account for the content of training.
• They are reported inconsistently.
As such, BFTDs alone are an incomplete measure or indicator
of readiness and therefor are unable to provide a direct
relationship to resource expenditures. Furthermore, the CNA
study found that increases and decreases in BFTDs reported
do not correlate with increases and decreases in unit
funding within the Operations and Maintenance account. This
may be because O&M funds are not only used to support
training and exercise activities but also maintenance and
supply activities, and the repair and replacement of
individual and unit equipment
.
training program, away from garrison or debarked from Naval shipping (DivO
P7110.1)
.
Another measure used by Marine Corps budget analysts as
performance criteria for budget justification has been
number of exercises. While this is a valid measure, it is
also incomplete. By their very nature exercises differ
significantly in size, scope and cost. This makes it
difficult to determine an "average exercise" and relate it
to specific costs. Additionally, JCS directed and other
joint exercises are funded from various sources besides
Marine Corps O&M. These factors make it difficult to
establish an adequate relationship between number of
exercises and O&M expenditures.
In addition to BFTDs and number of exercises the Marine
Corps evaluates unit training readiness using the Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Marine Corps
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) . Both of these
systems are highly subjective in nature and do not provide
detailed measures which can be directly related to budgets.
While the Marine Corps is beginning to track deployment
tempo (DEPTEMPO)
,
it lacks the narrower OPTEMPO data that
could better relate to expenditures. A more in-depth
discussion of measuring training readiness is contained in
Chapter II of this thesis.
2 . Resources to Readiness
As the United States continues to draw down its Armed
Forces in response to declining fiscal resources emphasis on
readiness and training is increasing in order to avoid
creating a "hollow" force. However, the constantly changing
global environment has imposed ever-growing demands on our
Nation's military. Today's forces are being called upon to
not only defend the Nation, but also to support a variety of
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) including
combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, humanitarian
assistance and peacekeeping operations. These missions are,
to a great degree, funded at the expense of readiness and
training for warfighting capabilities. (Prettol, 1995)
Maintaining acceptable readiness today and in the
future will require a delicate balance between funding for
current operations, modernization of existing equipment, the
procurement of new weapon systems and maintaining an
adequate force structure. Achieving such a balance will
rely on a continuous effort to better define resource
requirements and link those requirements to readiness.
A finding of this research is that very little progress
has been made in the way of linking resources, i.e. funding
provided through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) , to readiness for the Marine Corps operating
forces. Three major difficulties are noted:
• Determining adequate quantitative measures of
readiness for Marine ground combat units.
• Costs associated with readiness are difficult to
ascertain from existing databases.
• Limited availability of OPTEMPO data.
A more in-depth analysis of these findings is expressed
in Chapter II of this thesis.
One approach the Marine Corps has taken in an attempt
to link readiness with budget requirements is the
implementation of a Requirements Based Budgeting (RBB)
system. The intent of RBB is to standardize the budget
process for all three Marine Divisions and link readiness
with resource requirements. RBB provides a method to
document costs relative to accomplishing specific training
standards required to maintain combat readiness for each
Division. While RBB may be used as a tool in the POM
process and at mid-year review to justify funding levels, it
is not useful for budget formulation and justifications at
the HQMC level (Busick, 1997) . A more in-depth discussion
of RBB is contained in Chapter II of this thesis.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
Initially, the purpose of this thesis was to identify,
evaluate and analyze a variety of performance measurements
for Marine Corps Operational Forces in an attempt to relate
specific measurements to O&M funding requirements.
Significant metrics could then be utilized to better
explain budget level changes to DoD and DoN budget analysts.
The objective was to demonstrate a relationship between
readiness/OPTEMPO and resources, namely O&M dollars, as a
method for budget justification. However, limited
availability of data and the lack of established management
information systems (MIS) that adequately and reliably track
certain parametric measures of consumption, activity or
OPTEMPO make this task extremely difficult.
Instead, this thesis will address, as a long term
fundamental question, the contribution of cost analysis to
the formulation and justification of budgets. In the course
of this research a relatively new database was examined, the
Marine Operating and Support Information System (MOSIS)
,
which was developed in conjunction with the Navy Visibility
and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC)
program. The existence of such a database creates an
opportunity for providing a connection between measures of
OPTEMPO and certain cost factors. Since the database is
relatively new, the data collected are limited in content
and do not provide all the necessary information. However,
they can generate some useful insight that will provide the
basis for future analysis of the resources to readiness
issue
.
In an attempt to answer the research questions below
this thesis will: (1) examine the issues facing Marine Corps
Operations and Maintenance funding, specifically looking at
Marine Operational Forces; (2) discuss research issues
relating to Marine Corps ground readiness, noting the
difficulties in defining suitable indicators of
readiness/OPTEMPO that can be used as a performance
measurement of effectiveness and efficiency for operating
forces; (3) describe the DoD VAMOSC Program and the VAMOSC
systems used by the different Military Departments; (4)
evaluate the progress of incorporating USMC ground combat
weapon systems in Navy VAMOSC and the details of the MOSIS
database; and (5) provide recommendations for future data
collection and areas of research to make the initial
objective of this thesis executable.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Are there specific quantitative measurements that
capture the intensity of Marine Operating Force's operations
well enough to explain budget level changes for O&M funding?
2 . Secondary Research Questions
1) What quantitative measurements have budget analysts at
HQMC used in the past to explain budget level changes?
2) Are these measures inappropriate or inadequate? If so,
why?
3) What has been the past trend of O&M funding for Marine
Operating Forces?
4) What are the significant cost factors that relate to
O&M expenditures for Marine Operating Forces?
5) Can these cost factors be linked to operating tempo
(OPTEMPO)
?
6) Can measures of readiness or OPTEMPO be linked to O&M
funding requirements?
7) How does the MOSIS database and Marine VAMOSC program
contribute to cost analysis?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis analyzes the data presented in the U.S.
Marine Corps Operating and Support Cost Reports for Ground
Combat Systems for FY96. A major question of this thesis is
the validity of the data contained in MOSIS and their
potential use in providing a linkage between O&M budgets and
OPTEMPO/readiness
.
The analysis will be limited to Marine Corps ground
combat systems selected for inclusion in the MOSIS database
by Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Installations and Logistics (DCS(I&L)). Additional
limitations placed on this thesis include the limited data
collected on the systems included in MOSIS, the lack of
10
available OPTEMPO data, limited access to the MOSIS database
and the difficulty in defining true measures of readiness.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was limited to unclassified sources
only. Data were gathered from DoD, DoN and USMC documents,
books, and various studies and reports. Additionally, the
author traveled to Washington, D.C. and met with individuals
at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) involved with the
formulation and execution of Marine Corps budgets and
civilian contractors responsible for development of the
Marine VAMOSC program. Through these meetings additional
discussions were held and information provided via telephone
and email. Since information gathered through these sources
was more in the nature of fact finding and not formal
interviews, it is cited by general reference to the
discussion and the individual's name and position.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter I discusses the background and context for this
research and defines the objectives, scope, limitations and
methodologies of the study. Chapter II provides additional
background information on the Marine Corps Operating Forces.
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Included in this chapter are information on the
organizational structure of the Marine Operating Forces, the
Operations and Maintenance appropriation for the Marine
Corps, budgeting for Marine Operating Forces, and a
discussion of current OPTEMPO and readiness issues and the
indicators of readiness used by Marine ground combat units.
Chapter III defines and outlines the VAMOSC program within
the Department of Defense. Included is a discussion of
Operating and Support (O&S) costs, the history of the VAMOSC
program and a brief synopsis of each Service's VAMOSC
system. Chapter IV reports on the progress made on
incorporating Marine ground systems into Navy VAMOSC.
Specifically, this chapter will review the intricacies of
the MOSIS database and the FY 96 Cost Report for USMC ground
combat systems. Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions,
recommendations and defines areas for further research.
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II. MARINE CORPS OPERATING FORCES
A. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The United States Marine Corps includes Headquarters
Marine Corps, the Operating Forces of the Marine Corps,
Marine Corps Supporting Establishments and the Marine Corps
Reserve. The operating forces consist of the Fleet Marine
Forces (FMF) , complements on board naval vessels, security
forces at Navy shore activities, special activity forces and
combat forces not otherwise assigned. (FMFM 1-2)
The FMF consists of the warfighting elements of the
Marine Corps
.
It is designed as a balanced force of ground
and air combat arms along with their associated combat and
logistical support elements. There are two FMFs in the
active Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) and
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT) . The specific
missions of the FMF as defined in FMFM 1-2 are:
1) To serve with the fleets in the seizure or defense of
advance Naval bases and in the conduct of such land
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a
naval operation or campaign.
13
2) To participate, as directed by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (CMC), in the development of doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing
forces in amphibious operations.
3) To train and equip Fleet Marine Forces for amphibious
operations, air movement /prepositioned deployment,
naval political reinforcement operations, and land
operations associated with naval warfare and naval
support of continental warfare.
4) To maintain forces in readiness for operational
commitment commensurate with the strategic situation,
the unified commander's requirements, and training time
required to ensure tactical success when committed.
The Marine Operating Forces (MARFORs) , are considered
the heart of the Marine Corps. They constitute the forward
presence, crisis response and fighting power available to
the regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) . In FY 1996
Operating Forces were comprised of 106,759 Marines, roughly
60 percent of the active duty force structure (Zinner,
1996) .
14
The MARFORs are organized under two major commands,
Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) and Marine Forces Atlantic
(MARFORLANT)
.
MARFORPAC, with headquarters at Camp H. M.
Smith, Hawaii, is composed of the 1^^ Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) located in Camp Pendleton, California and the
3""^ Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) located in Okinawa,
Japan. MARFORLANT, with headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, is composed of the 2"^^ Marine Expeditionary Force
(II MEF) also located in Camp Lejeune. Figure 2.1 depicts
























Figure 2.1 Marine Corps Organizational Structure
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The MARFORs provide the regional CINCs with a Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) ready to and capable of
rapidly responding to any crises around the globe. Each





an Air Combat Element (ACE) and a Combat
Service Support Element (CSSE) .
The CE is the headquarters element of the MAGTF. It is
responsible for providing effective command and control
while organizing, planning and executing operations. The
GCE is a task organized ground combat force responsible for
conducting ground operations in support of the MAGTF
mission. The ACE is a task organized aviation command
responsible for providing combat air operations in support
of the MAGTF mission. The CSSE is task organized to provide
a full range of support functions and capabilities in
support of the MAGTF mission to include supply, maintenance,
transportation, general engineering, and health services. A
MAGTF can vary in size from just over 2,000 Marines to a
multiple division sized force.
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest
form of an organized MAGTF and is comprised of one or more
16
Marine Divisions, one or more Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW),
and one or more Force Service Support Groups (FSSG)^. There
are three standing MEFs in the active Marine Corps; I MEF,
comprised of the l""" Marine Division, 1^^ MAW and 1^^ FSSG,
There are similar organizations for II MEF and III MEF. The
MEF is designed to fight in large scale crises and
contingencies. It is normally commanded by a lieutenant
general and is capable of sustained operations for up to 60












Figure 2.2 MEF Organizational Structure
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest
form of a MAGTF and is comprised of a reinforced infantry
battalion, composite helicopter squadron, a MEU Service
Support Group (MSSG) and a headquarters/command element.
Commanded by a colonel, a MEU is organized, equipped and
2 During peacetime a MEF consists of a single Division, MAW and FSSG. During
wartime a MEF may include multiple Divisions, MAWs and FSSGs
.
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trained to conduct a variety of conventional warfighting
missions as well as maritime special purpose missions.
Typically, MEUs forward deploy for approximately six months
aboard naval amphibious ships as part of an Amphibious Ready
Group (ARG) . A MEU is capable of conducting independent
sustained operations for 15 days. Currently, there are
seven MEUs in the active Marine Corps. The 11'^, 13"^-, 15'^,
and 31^^ MEUs report to MARFORPAC and the 22"^ 24'^, and 26'^
MEUs report to MARFORLANT
.
B. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE MARINE CORPS (0&M,MC)
The Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (0&;M,MC)
appropriation provides funding in support of the FMF,
equipment and facilities maintenance, civilian employee pay,
travel and transportation, training, consumable supplies,
recruiting and advertising, base operations and base
communications. (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997),
1. Funding Categories
OScM,MC is divided into various funding categories that
provide for the expenses of several activities. It is
comprised of three subordinate Budget Activities (BA) : (1)
BA-1 Operating Forces; (2) BA-3 Training and Recruiting; and
(3) BA-4 Administrative and Service Wide Activities. The
budget activity that contributes to the training, readiness
and OPTEMPO activities of the combat units within the Marine
Corps is mostly contained within BA-l^.
Each budget activity is further divided into activity
groups (AGs) and sub-activity groups (SAGs) . BA-1 is
divided into AG lA-Expeditionary Forces, and AG IB-USMC
Prepositioning Forces. The Expeditionary Force AG provides
for the operating forces that constitute the MAGTF and
Marine Security Forces at naval installations and aboard
naval vessels. These funds provide financing for training
and routine operations; the maintenance and repair of
organic ground equipment; routine supplies, travel, per diem
and emergency leave; automatic data processing; and initial
purchase as well as replenishment and replacement of both
unit and individual equipment . Financing is also provided
for travel expenses associated with the operating forces.
This includes the movement of troops to and from exercises
^ The training conducted within BA3 is institutional in nature {formal schools,




as well as Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) assignments
associated with the mission. (DoN, 1997)
The Expeditionary Forces AG is further divided into the
following SAGs : (1) lAlA-Operational Forces; (2) 1A2A-Field
Logistics; (3) lA3A-Depot Maintenance; and (4) 1A4A-Base
Support
.
The most prevalent view of ground OPTEMPO budget
activities (the variable cost associated with the conduct of
unit operations and training) incorporates the annual
funding contained in the Operational Forces SAG. The Field
Logistics SAG supports the overall weapons systems
management and logistics support for the FMF, the Depot
Maintenance SAG finances major repair and rebuild of ground
equipment and the installation cost of modification kits.
The Base Support SAG funds the operation of various Marine
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Figure 2.3 Structure of 0&M,MC
All Marine aircraft are considered a component of Naval
aviation, therefore all flight activity is supported by the
Navy's Flying Hour Program (FHP) and funding is furnished
through the Operations and Maintenance Navy (0&iM,N)
appropriation. The distinction between using OScM,MC and
0&:M,N is commonly referred to as "green dollars" versus
"blue dollars". While "blue dollars" pay for fuel,
maintenance and other costs associated with aircraft and
flight operations, "green dollars" fund all remaining
activities not associated with flight operations, to include
the fuel and maintenance of ground vehicles and equipment
that do not directly support flight operations, supply,
administrative expenses, etc.
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Blue dollars fund two broad categories, the FHP and the
non-Flying Hour Program. Basically, FHP dollars pay for
fuel and aviation depot level reparables . Non-FHP dollars
pay for all other requirements that support the FHP such as
TAD in support of the FHP, Inventory Maintenance List, Table
of Basic Allowance, flight equipment (flight suits, helmets,
etc.), tools, computers and so on. (Ronning, 1997).
2 . Budgeting for Marine Operating Forces
Funding for the MARFORs is provided through the annual
0&M,MC appropriation, part of the overall budget for the
Department of the Navy. The Marine Corps utilizes a bottom
up approach in the POM formulation process whereby
subordinate commands submit their budget requests, limited
by top line constraints, to HQMC . For the most part these
requests are based on historical spending patterns and the
previous year's execution data contained in the Standard
Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting System (SABRS)
.
Submitting commands identify the priorities for specific
functions and organizations within their commands and
include full justification for those programs in narrative
form. The POM goes through a series of reviews and
22
revisions and is transformed into the Budget Estimate
Submission (BES) which is forwarded through DoN and OSD to
Congress for approval
.
The POM and BES each contain data regarding OPTEMPO
related resources as a means for budget justification.
However, these data are limited to BFTDs, equipment
utilization data and number of exercises, none of which
provide a clear relationship between readiness and fiscal
resources. There continues to be a need for a more
reliable, quantitative measure of OPTEMPO, readiness or
operational activity that will justify Marine Corps O&M
budgets to the Navy, OSD and Congress.
3 . Requirements Based Budgeting (RBB)
One approach the Marine Corps has taken in an attempt
to relate readiness to budgetary requirements is the
implementation of a Requirements Based Budgeting (RBB)
system. The intent of RBB is to standardize the budget
process for all three Marine Divisions and link readiness
with resource requirements. RBB provides a method to
document costs relative to accomplishing specific training
23
standards required to maintain combat readiness for each
Division
.
RBB is a relatively new concept. Initially developed
by the 2""^ Marine Division in the early 1990' s, it has now
been implemented throughout all three active Divisions. The
goals of this new budgeting systems are to: (1) determine
the fiscal requirements to train and maintain a Marine
Division; (2) standardize all Division (GCE) budget
processes; (3) link readiness with budget requirements; and
(4) establish and maintain a higher POM priority (RBB
Presentation, 1^^ MARDIV) .
Prior to RBB, budgets were prepared based on historical
trends. Each Division was given a control figure (ceiling)
from its higher headquarters based on the previous years
spending patterns with increments and decrements reflecting
new requirements and fiscal constraints. Budgets were
prepared in accordance with the constraints imposed by the
ceilings with a list of noted deficiencies that required
additional funding. The division would attempt to fund the
highest priority deficiencies first and petition higher
24
headquarters for additional funding for the non- funded
items
.
In an era of declining resources the historical policy
of building future budgets on previous spending patterns
guarantees the Divisions budget will be reduced on a 'fair
share' basis. To ensure budgets are based on requirements
we must present data in an objective, factual format, thus
the need for a Requirements Based Budget. The RBB is a
systematic determination of fiscal actions required to field
and maintain a combat ready force and the costing of those
actions. This will allow the Division to prepare a budget
based on needs and quantifiable costs. Such a document
presents a powerful argument in the competition of
resources. Implementation of RBB will not be easy, it
requires a cultural change in how we have historically Done
business. (DivO P7110.1, 1996)
RBB was created as a system that could be used to
justify financial requirements by demonstrating a distinct
connection between readiness and fiscal resources. This was
to provide a basis from which an argument for a specified
25
funding amount in support of a desired level of readiness
could be made.
RBB is accomplished through a uniform set of procedures
where costs required to establish and maintain combat
readiness within the Division are determined. To establish
a requirements based budget, specific funding requirements
for the Division must be identified and broken down into
appropriate funding centers. A basis for determining the
costs associated with each funding center is then
incorporated into the budget. These funding centers capture
all the costs necessary to train Marines, maintain
equipment, and ultimately support readiness. There are
eight funding centers associated with a Marine Division:
Training; Capitalization; Automated Data Processing (ADP)
;
Administrative Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) ; Defense
Service Supply Center (DSSC) costs; emerging requirements;
contracts; and one time un- funded requirements. As a
presentation of how RBB attempts to link fiscal resources to
readiness this analysis will focus on the procedures used to
establish budget estimates for the training funding center.
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The purpose of the training funding center is to
provide resources in support of the Division's training
exercises. The focus of the RBB training funding centers is
to identify the resources necessary to support the
Division's Mission Essential Task List (METL) . The METL is
a list of specific training standards that must be
accomplished in order to satisfy specific performance
guidelines for the Division's readiness. METLs are
completed by executing a variety of training events
described as Mission Performance Standards (MPS) and
Individual Training Standards (ITS) . METLs are established
down to the Battalion level, MPS are established down to the
squad/crew level and ITS are established for individual
Marines
.
Assigning a cost to each specific standard would be a
long, arduous and subjective task. Recognizing this the
Commanding Generals of each active Marine Division agreed to
use BFTDs as a proxy to standardized METL accomplishment.
Each METL is satisfied by the successful execution of
specific MPS or ITS relating to that particular METL. A
predetermined number of BFTDs required to accomplish each
27
MPS and ITS is subsequently established. An example of a
section of a notional Regimental METL/BFTD matrix was
extracted from the 3'''^ Marine Division Budget Manual and is
provided in Figure 2-4.
METL BFTD MPS STANDARD
I . Conduct Amphibious
Operations
4 MPS 2A.1.1 Conduct Amphibious
Staff Planning
3 MPS 2A.1.2 Develop Landing Plan
6 MPS 2A.1.3 Conduct Assault
Landing
4 MPS 2A.1.5 Conduct Amphibious
Withdrawal
Figure 2-4 Regimental METL
Individual units determine the BFTDs necessary to
accomplish their METLs and then identify financial resources
required to execute those BFTDs. BFTDs are compared with
METLs to ensure funding requirements are identified to meet
required training objectives.
Since BFTDs are assigned at the Battalion level and
many units conduct training at lower levels (Company,
Platoon, Section levels) equivalency factors have been
established that weight subordinate units relative to their
Table of Organization (T/0) and Table of Equipment (T/E)
.
For example, a rifle company has an equivalency factor of
.25. If a rifle company spends four eight-hour days in the
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field that is equivalent to 1 BFTD (4X. 25-1.0 BFTD) . (Budget
Manual, 3d MARDIV)
The Unit Training Cost Model is used to determine unit
training cost budget estimates associated with planned
training events. METL requirements, as defined by BFTDs
,
are multiplied by specific cost factors to establish a
training cost forecast
.
The cost factors used are based on
current usage and pricing data derived primarily from
battery, maintenance, and petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL)
costs. Data is accumulated through the Maintenance Cost
System (MCS) , the Logistics Management Information System
(LMIS) , the Standard Accounting Budgeting and Reporting
System (SABRS) , and incorporated into the Division Redbook
.
The Redbook is a manual of cost factors used to "cost out"
training events. The cost factors are derived using the
information systems listed above and are reviewed and
updated on an annual basis. (Budget Manual, 3DMARDIV)
RBB is a process that is applied at a high level of
detail and may not prove itself useful at the HQMC level for
budget formulation and justification. However, it is a step
toward using a method of budgeting other than historical
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spending patterns and comptroller judgement. There are some
negative aspects to RBB . Most notable is the increased
demand on subordinate units to monitor BFTDs and determine
unit cost factors.
C. OPERATING TEMPO AND READINESS
1 . Measuring Operating Tempo
Operating tempo is a measure of operating activity used
to demonstrate the level of operations and training a unit
achieves over time. Common measures currently used within
DoD include aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days,
vehicle miles driven and ammunition expended. In conducting
research for this thesis no reliable measures of OPTEMPO
used by Marine Operating Forces (ground forces) could be
directly related to O&M funding levels. As discussed
previously BFTDs are an incomplete measure of activity and
are inconsistently reported. Other measures such as vehicle
miles driven or ammunition expended aren't readily available
nor are they reliably recorded in a manner that make them
easily accessible for analysis.
Due to the nature of operations Marines are called on
to perform and because of the role the Marine Corps assumes
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as the Nation's forward deployed force in readiness, it
routinely deploys its forces overseas or aboard naval
amphibious ships. The emphasis placed on cyclical unit
deployments influenced the Marine Corps to use a measure
called deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO) as a way of measuring and
recording unit activity.
DEPTEMPO is defined as the percentage of time in a
given annual period that a unit, or element of a unit,
supports operations or training away from its home base or
station for a period greater than or equal to ten
consecutive days (Cotto, 1997) . DEPTEMPO is tracked through
the Marine Corps Training, Exercise and Employment Plan
(MCTEEP) system. MCTEEP is relational database developed by
the Marine Corps to support planning, execution and
visibility of training, exercise and deployment activities
throughout the FMF. It contains information on scheduled,
current and completed operations, specific units and
resource (vehicles, equipment, etc.) requirements. It
provides information necessary for Commanders to effectively
plan training, exercise and employment activities with the
efficient use of available resources. (MCTEEP Web Page)
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"Currently implemented throughout the MARFORs , MCTEEP will
show the impact of tempo on readiness. Future MCTEEP
programs will support predictive readiness." (USMC Concepts
and Issues, 1997) .
However, DEPTEMPO does not provide a useful tool for
budget justification because it merely addresses the rate of
deployment related activity and not a level of total
activity for the MARFORs. For example, if a unit conducts a
training exercise that is less than ten days in duration, it
is not included in the DEPTEMPO calculation. Consequently,
a unit which may be maintaining a high operating tempo by
conducting numerous short term exercises (less than ten
days) will not show an increase in DEPTEMPO.
To understand the differences between OPTEMPO and
DEPTEMPO it is important to recognize the nature of Marine
Corps operations and their deployment schedules. Marines
not only deploy in support of military operations and to
conduct training exercises, they also deploy on routine six
month deployments in fulfillment of the nation's power
projection and forward presence missions. There are two
deployment programs in which Marine units participate on a
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continuous basis, the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and MEU
deployments aboard Naval amphibious ships.
Under the Unit Deployment Program infantry battalions
and their supporting units deploy from their home bases in
the Continental United States (CONUS) or Hawaii to Okinawa,
Japan where they become attached to 3D MARDIV for
approximately six months. There are four battalions
committed to UDP deployments, three from MARFORPAC (two from
the west coast and one from Hawaii) and one from MARFORLANT
.
On average two battalions are deployed to Okinawa at any
given time of year.
Under the MEU deployment program one MEU from the west
coast (MARFORPAC) and one MEU from the east coast
(MARFORLANT) are committed to MEU deployments.
Traditionally, MEUs from MARFORPAC deploy to the western
Pacific and MEUs from MARFORLANT deploy to the
Mediterranean. Deployment schedules are arranged where on
average at least one MEU is at sea at any given time of the
year.
In preparation for deployments both UDP and MEU
battalions go through a rigorous pre -deployment training
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program. This normally takes place during the six months
prior to the deployment . The focus of training is at the
company/battery and battalion levels and usually requires
conducting operations at special locations and with other
units. An example of this is the Combined Arms Exercise
(CAX) conducted at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
in Twenty Nine Palms, California. It is obvious that in
this stage of the training cycle OPTEMPO for these units is
high. Intuitively one would think that this increase in
OPTEMPO would relate to increases in readiness. However,
during the course of this research little data were found
supporting this view.
2 . Readiness Issues
Readiness is "the ability to provide capabilities
required by the combatant commanders to execute their
assigned missions ... to deliver the outputs for which
(the unit) was designed." (JCS, 1989)
A recent study by the RAND Corporation (Dahlman, 1995)
discusses readiness related issues the military is facing in
the wake of previous downsizing efforts. Dahlman emphasizes
three potential problem areas for readiness related
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activities. First, the turbulent political environment
lends itself to an unequal distribution of cutbacks. Areas
that are easiest to cut, readiness related activities such
as force structure, are hit hardest while complex and
problematic areas, such as infrastructure, are often left
unscathed. Second, unforeseen events (peace keeping
missions, contingency operations, etc.) that are usually
unplanned and unfunded consume O&M dollars that should have
gone towards readiness related training. Third, achieving a
balance between different long term goals for the future,
most notably the balance between force structure and
modernization, is very difficult. The difficulties with
measuring readiness only exacerbate these problems.
The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is
used by all services to report overall combat readiness to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) . Based on
available resources, a unit commander rates his overall
combat readiness in four areas: personnel, training,
quantity of equipment and supplies, and condition of
equipment. Ratings range from CI (the unit maintains the
necessary resources to meet its wartime mission) to C4 (the
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unit is lacking the necessary resources to meet its wartime
mission) . A rating of C5 is assigned to units that are not
ready due to a preplanned activity, for example ships in
overhaul or new units being formed.
In addition to C-ratings, Marine Corps ground units use
training readiness ratings, or T-ratings, as an assessment
of the number of days required for a unit to be fully
trained. A unit with a T-rating of 1 requires less than 14
days of additional training to become fully trained. Figure
2.5 outlines the criteria for training readiness ratings.






Figure 2.5 T-Rating Criteria
The use of SORTS ratings as a measure of readiness has
been criticized for a variety of reasons. First of all,
SORTS scores emphasize tracking resources rather than
performance. Second, units may be evaluated in a scenario
that does not reflect their actual wartime role. Finally,
there is concern over the accuracy and timeliness of the
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scores. Some experts speculate that there is the
possibility of "gaming" by commanders concerned with
protecting or enhancing their reputation. (CBO, 1997)
Betts (1995) points out that using SORTS scores to
reflect changes in O&M spending levels for operating forces
is difficult because there is little unclassified,
comprehensive, or quantitative data available for
comparison
.
Dahlman (1995) argues that in order to efficiently and
effectively distribute resources across units within the
services readiness should be viewed as a management process,
with decision making at the senior commander level to
produce a force capable of meeting wartime requirements,
rather than a production process, where unit level
commanders apply resources to enable their units to perform
certain tasks to standards that may or may not reflect
wartime requirements.
During a hearing on force readiness during
deliberations on the FY 96 defense budget, the Chairman for




Readiness is a complex issue. In addition to tank
miles, flying hours and steaming days, there are
many other factors which impact on overall
readiness - personnel tempo, maintenance backlogs,
morale, quality of life, base operations support,
equipment modernization, recruiting and retention.
Add to this the impact of unfunded contingency
operations and the funding turbulence associated
with such operations. . . . The traditional system
for measuring readiness is inadequate. Its focus
is narrow, it is too subjective, it is not
consistently applied across services, commands or
units, and can be misleading. Further, it has no
predictive value of future force readiness.
3 . Measuring Readiness in the Marine Corps
The definition of readiness, also referred to as
operational or current readiness, provided in JCS Pub- 1-02
(1994), "Readiness is the ability of forces to deploy
quickly and perform initially in war time as they were
designed," correlates directly to the Marine Corps' mission.
As outlined in a recent CNA research memorandum (Jareb,
1994) the Marine Corps uses three measures of unit training
readiness: BFTDs, SORTS ratings and the Marine Corps Combat
Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)
.
Each of these measures requires a certain subjective
element of the assessment of readiness. As discussed
previously, BFTDs report a level of unit activity not a
level of readiness. Implicitly, one can hypothesize that
more BFTDs results in more training thus increased
proficiency and readiness. However, this would only be true
if BFTDs were efficiently utilized. Unfortunately, there
are no established standards for the conduct, content or
quality of BFTDs.
As previously discussed, SORTS ratings have many
limitations. In addition, a recent study conducted by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1994) found that SORTS
ratings for Marine Corps units over a period of 13 years
were relatively stable. It is difficult to determine
whether the ratings were the result of an abundance of
resources, the efficient use of resources or the
unwillingness of commanders to report that their units were
not ready.
While overall SORTS ratings can be adjusted based on
the subjective judgment of unit commanders, T-ratings are
the most subjective. One would expect T-ratings to decrease
as a unit nears deployment and increase in the months
following deployment. However, the CNA study found that T-
ratings were insensitive to a unit's position within the
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training cycle. In fact, 90 percent of infantry battalion
SORTS T-ratings were reported at T-1 over a 14 quarter
period. (Jareb, 1994) . From this, one could conclude that
the subjectivity inherent in SORTS ratings may overstate
readiness. Moreover, the CNA study was unable to
demonstrate how significantly SORTS ratings impact changes
in resources
.
A third measure of readiness is the Marine Corps
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) . The MCCRES is
a comprehensive training evaluation program used to evaluate
the efficiency and effectiveness of unit training. Its
purpose is to provide feedback designed to help unit
commanders identify training deficiencies, assess the
effectiveness of training programs and revise training
programs. The MCCRES consists of a comprehensive list of
Mission Performance Standards (MPS) unique to a specific
unit type (i.e., infantry, artillery, etc.) that the unit
must master. These standards represent the minimum
performance necessary to successfully pass the MCCRES. (MCO
3501. IC)
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The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated in a 1993
White Paper that
:
Using the MCCRES properly is fundamental in
determining training readiness. It is our primary-
system to assess and evaluate unit training based
on approved combat requirements- -the mission
statement. Correctly executed, it can assess unit
capabilities, aid in planning unit training, and
serve as an evaluation tool to measure readiness
in terms of published combat performance
standards
.
Even though the MCCRES is based on specified standards
and published guidelines, there still remains some degree of
subjectivity present in the system. In the past, unit
commanders have taken undue liberties in interpreting and
executing MCCRES requirements (CMC, 1993) . This leads to
inconsistency in the conduct of MCCRES throughout the Marine
Corps and introduces a degree of bias that detracts from
using the MCCRES as a true measure of readiness
.
Although subjective, these three measures of readiness
provide a qualitative sense of unit readiness. However, the
fact remains, demonstrating the link between O&M spending




One would expect that as spending on O&M, readiness
related funds, increases or decreases indicators of
readiness would follow the same pattern. A CBO study (1997)
examined this issue by comparing O&M spending levels with
readiness indicators for the Army, Air Force and Navy. They
found that SORTs ratings remained remarkable stable over a
15 year period, from 1981 to 1996, and OPTEMPO changed
insignificantly while average O&M spending, particularly in
the Army and Air Force, increased significantly. In the
Navy average spending declined while indicators for
readiness remained high. An examination of Marine Corps
spending patterns was not included in the study. In
summary, they were unable to demonstrate any linkage between
resources expended and readiness levels achieved.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter broadly covered the issues relating fiscal
resources to readiness for Marine Corps Operating Forces.
It began with a description of the MARFORs and the funding
categories relating to those forces. Next it described
budgeting for Marine Operating Forces. A new approach to
budgeting by attempting to link readiness and resources was
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also examined. Finally, the issues of measuring and
recording OPTEMPO and readiness indicators for Marine ground
combat units were discussed.
"Devising the best way to demonstrate a link between
the application of resources and the achieved operational
readiness is difficult and is likely to be an evolutionary
process." (GAO/NSIAD-172 , 1989). While there are no notable
solutions to the resources- to-readiness issues presented
herein, the information presented demonstrates a distinct
need to continue efforts to better define and understand
this problem. One such effort is the Visibility and
Management of Operations and Support Cost Program which is
introduced in the next chapter.
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III. VISIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATING AND SUPPORT
COSTS
A. OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS
1. Definition
Operating and Support (O&S) costs, as defined by-
various DoD directives, are those costs directly related to
the operation, maintenance, supply and all other logistical
support of a fielded weapon system. Specifically, this
includes the cost of personnel; consumable and reparable
materials; organizational, intermediate and depot level
maintenance; contract support and sustaining investment^.
O&S costs are incurred from the moment a system is prepared
for its initial fielding and continue throughout its entire
life cycle. Table 3.1 lists the generic O&S cost elements
commonly considered in cost analysis.
O&S costs can be further divided into direct O&S costs
and indirect O&S costs. Direct O&S costs are variable cost
elements that vary directly with incremental changes in
Procurement costs included in sustaining investment are costs incurred for
modification kit procurement and installation, training munitions, support
equipment replacement and the recurring procurement costs that result from
operating a new system (O&S Cost Estimating Guide)
.
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force structure and OPTEMPO . Indirect O&S costs are those
costs that do not vary directly with incremental changes in


































Table 3.1 Generic O&S Cost Element Structure
From, Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide
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In budget terms, OScS costs can be viewed as O&M plus
Military Personnel (MilPers) , the two primary funding
sources for readiness.
OScS costs reflect the commitment of a military
establishment to readiness (Hildebrandt , 1990). Readiness,
as defined previously, demands that sufficient resources be
allocated to the effective operation and support of weapon
systems during peacetime. Adequate funding of O&S
activities is a key component of readiness. Without these
resources, units would fail to meet appropriate standards of
equipment and training readiness.
2. Historical Trends in O&S Spending
Historically, O&S costs (broadly defined) account for
roughly 60 percent of the overall defense budget (Devers,
1993) . As reductions in force structure take affect, and in
an era of declining budgets, one would expect O&S costs to
fall accordingly. However, there is a general consensus
throughout DoD that O&S costs have not decreased relative to
recent declines in force structure (Horowitz, 1997) .
This research determined that O&S costs for DoD, in
constant dollars, were higher in 1995 than they were twenty
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years earlier. However, after taking into account changes
in accounting policy the increase was less than initially
thought. Moreover, when only looking at core mission O&S,
spending by combat units and other units that deploy during
wartime, O&S spending was slightly less in 1995 than in
1975. However, during the same period the decline in force
structure was much greater than the reductions seen in
direct O&S spending. For example, between 1975 and 1995
military personnel fell by 30 percent, combat divisions by
36 percent, aircraft carriers by 25 percent and bomber
aircraft by 72 percent while direct spending on O&S forces
increased by 12 percent, when measured comparably in both
years (Horowitz, 1997) . Once again changes in O&S spending
are not congruent with the declining force structure.
In addition, the IDA study found that the growth in O&S
was concentrated in the O&M appropriations. This was not
surprising. A decrease in force size should see a decrease
in the MILPERS appropriations as well as infrastructure
spending. While MILPERS has declined in line with force
reductions, infrastructure spending has not. Approximately
40 percent of the increases in O&M was directly related to
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combat forces while the other 60 percent was related to the
support functions. The support O&S expenditures include
medical and health services, intelligence and
communications, and environmental compliance.
Borga and Horowitz (1997) categorize O&S spending as
Mission O&S, Mission Support O&S and Other O&S spending.
Mission O&S includes costs most closely related to combat
forces, which consist of the costs of operations, direct
training and depot maintenance . These are the funds that
are likely to have the greatest impact on readiness.
Mission Support O&S includes such things as institutional
training, base operations and operational headquarters.
Other O&S spending includes medical, environmental,
administrative, intelligence and communications, etc. These
final two categories relate primarily to infrastructure.
Applying the same definitions to O&M spending Figure
3.1 depicts the relationship between Mission O&M and O&M
spent on infrastructure related activities (Support O&M plus
Other O&M) for DoD as a whole. Notice that over the last 10
years, a period in which force structure declined
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significantly, O&M spending relating to infrastructure
remained relatively stable while Mission O&M declined.
Figure 3.1 Historical O&M Spending for DoD^
Figure 3.2 depicts the relationship between Mission O&M
and O&M spent on infrastructure related activities for the
Marine Corps. In this case there is a direct relationship
between changes in Mission O&M and changes in infrastructure
related O&M.
^ Data corrected for contingency spending. Provided by Stan Horowitz, Institute
of Defense Analysis. NOTE: Due to corrections made for contingency spending
during the Gulf War the 1991 data is artificially low and should be ignored.
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Figure 3.2 Historical O&M Spending for USMC^
From the above analysis it is difficult to determine
whether the rise in O&S costs has contributed to a rise in
capability (readiness) . While we have been unable to show
any distinct relationship between O&S spending and
readiness, one would expect there to be a close association
between the two. This relationship may not be easily
established on the aggregate level as was concluded by the
CBO study (1994) discussed in the previous chapter.
However, comparing O&S costs of specific weapon systems to
levels of OPTEMPO and readiness may provoke further
Data corrected for contingency spending. Provided by Stan Horowitz,
Institute of Defense Analysis.
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understanding of the resources-to-readiness relationship.
The DoD Visibility and Management of Operating and Support
Costs (VAMOSC) program provides one mechanism to do this.
B. VAMOSC PROGRAM
1. History
A need for a better system to manage O&S spending can
be traced as far back as the mid 1960 's when DoD officials
began to recognize a need for a better understanding of
where O&S costs are concentrated. They realized that
support costs were not accounted for along weapon systems
lines. This made it extremely difficult to determine the
amount of funding required to support a particular weapon
system. Assessing how alternate allocations of budgetary
resources would impact readiness was equally as difficult.
(CNO, 1974)
Furthermore, it was becoming apparent that an
increasing percentage of DoD fiscal resources were being
committed to O&S activities. If this were allowed to
continue without any intervention, the services would be
left without the necessary resources to procure replacement
weapon systems. There was a definite need for a system that
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would allow managers to track and analyze O&S costs and give
them the ability to study the impact that reductions in
support costs would have on readiness.
In 1974, in response to General Accounting Office (GAO)
recommendations to Congress that DoD accurately determine
O&S costs for weapons systems, the Deputy SECDEF requested
that each service secretary review his/her individual
service's efforts to effectively monitor and manage the
support costs associated with major weapon systems. MBO 9-2
(1974), "DoD Requirements for Visibility of Management of
Support Costs," directing each Service to develop weapon
system and component level O&S cost visibility and
standardize O&S cost terminology throughout the Services.
(Navy VAMOSC Web Page, 19 97)
2. Requirements, Objectives and Uses
Today DoD is congressionally mandated to track O&S
costs for all fielded major defense acquisition programs
(MDAP)'^. To meet this requirement DoD established the
A MDAP is an acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified
program (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and that is: (1) designated
by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T)) as an
MDAP, or (2) estimated by the USD (A&T) to require an eventual total expenditure
for research, development, test and evaluation of more than $355 million in FY
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VAMOSC Program. Under cognizant control of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIG) the VAMOSC program requires each component of
DoD to establish its own VAMOSC system. Each VAMOSC system
will collect, display, categorize and record historical O&S
costs, related data, and associated factors that determine
those costs, by MDAP . (DoD 5000. 4-M)
DoD Regulation 5000.2 requires independent estimates of
O&S costs as part of all Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) and the CAIG Cost Estimating Guide requires
the use of VAMOSC data when predicting O&S costs for
acquisition reviews.
The objectives of the VAMOSC system, as listed in DoD
Manual 5000.4, are:
• To provide visibility of O&S costs for use in cost
analysis of MDAPs and force structure alternatives
in support of the PPBS process.
• To provide visibility of critical maintenance and
support costs at the subsystem level in sufficient
1996 constant dollars or an eventual total expenditure for procurement of more
than 2.135 billion in FY 1996 constant dollars (DODD 5000. 2-R).
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detail to promote cost-conscious design and
configuration management of new and fielded defense
programs
.
• To provide visibility of O&S costs so they may be
managed to reduce and control program life-cycle
costs
.
• To improve the validity and credibility of O&S cost
estimates by establishing a widely accepted
database, thereby reducing the cost and time for
collecting these defense program O&S costs for
specific applications.
VAMOSC data is used as a basis for decisions concerning
af fordability, budget development, support concepts, cost
tradeoffs, modifications, and retention of current systems
(DoDD 5000.4) . It provides a useful tool to derive and
validate O&S costs of defense programs, assists in design
tradeoff analysis, supports the development of budgets, and
establishes standards for cost estimating. While the
majority of VAMOSC data applications relate to the defense
acquisition process, expanded collection of accurate and
reliable data will extend its capabilities to the
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development of cost factors and the development and
justification of budgets. In addition, detailed VAMOSC data
in the future may be used to relate O&S costs to various
measures of OPTEMPO and thus develop a relationship between
resources and readiness.
At the present time there are no requirements for
VAMOSC to collect and record OPTEMPO data and show their
impact on O&S costs. (Freeman, 1997) . However, the Air
Force, Army and Navy incorporate OPTEMPO into their systems
as a determinant of cost per flying hour, vehicle miles
driven and steaming hours. OPTEMPO data are also a key
factor in developing cost factors for the Army. While the
desire to include OPTEMPO data for Marine Corps ground
systems is apparent there has been little progress in this
area (Lucero, 1997)
.
C. AIR FORCE VAMOSC SYSTEM
The original VAMOSC system was developed by the Air
Force and became operational in 1982. This initial system
consisted of three major subsystems and a source data
preprocessor: the Weapon System Support Cost (WSSC)
Subsystem; the Component Support Cost Subsystem (CSCS) ; the
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Communications Electronics (CE) Subsystem; and the
Visibility and Management Overhead (VAMOH) Data Preprocessor
Subsystem. These systems were designed to monitor aircraft
O&S costs at the Mission Design Series (MDS) level, relate
engine component costs to weapon systems, improve the life
cycle costing capability for the acquisition of new weapon
systems and provide cost information to assist with design
trade-off studies, acquisition planning and budgeting.
In 1986 the Air Force started the VAMOSC modernization
program to enhance the system's capabilities. This effort
emphasized the development of a relational database
management system and improvement in the accuracy and
reliability of collected data. The result was a modernized
WSSC and CSCS and the new VAMOSC Source Data Preprocessor
(VSDP) subsystem. These systems were successfully fielded
in the early 1990' s and data products were made available to
the Air Force financial management community in 1995.
The esse and the VSDP deliver component O&S cost data
configured at the National Stock Number (NSN) and Work Unit
Code (WUC) level on a quarterly basis. The WSSC collects
data from a variety of financial, logistical and inventory
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management systems and provides detailed O&S data configured
at the weapon system level, as well as by MDS, command and
geographic location. O&S cost and operational data (flying
hours, inventory, etc.) are provided in the form of a
"DataPack" , a pre-defined data set available in spreadsheet
or ASCII format. The use of a relational database creates
flexibility for users of the system, allowing them to tailor
their data requests to meet specific, detailed requirements.
Air Force VAMOSC cost reports are available to authorized
users via the Internet/World Wide Web (WWW) and can be
downloaded and analyzed using spreadsheet software on a
personal computer.
In the near future the Air Force will incorporate
Weapon System Briefing Books into their VAMOSC program.
These briefing books will be available on-line and will
display weapon system costs, operational statistics,
personnel counts, and related trends and metrics (e.g., cost
per flying hour) . This will enable the end user to break
down summary data to greater levels of detail and conduct
cost analysis at the micro-level. (Air Force VAMOSC Web
Page, 1997)
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D. NAVY VAMOSC SYSTEM
In response to OSD direction, the Chief of Naval
Operations initiated a system to track O&S costs for Navy
and Marine aircraft in FY 1976 . A similar system was
established in FY 1977 for Navy ships. Throughout the years
the Navy's program to assess O&S costs, like similar
programs in the other Services, has been criticized by a
series of GAO reports for its inability to accurately
predict, report or verify O&S costs (Doermann, 1994) . In
order to provide better guidance and procedures for
collecting and reporting O&S data, responsibility for the
administration of the VAMOSC program was transferred to the
OSD CAIG in 1992. At the same time DoN centralized the
management of their VAMOSC system under the Naval Center for
Cost Analysis (NCCA)
.
Currently, Navy VAMOSC tracks historical O&S cost data
and provides reports in five major areas: (1) Ships
(including Military Sealift Command ships); (2) Aircraft
(both Navy and Marine); (3) Missiles and torpedoes; (4)
Automated Information Systems (AIS) ; and (5) Marine Corps
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Ground Combat Systems. Each of these reports displays data
at various levels of detail and composition.
The Navy VAMOSC system gathers data from existing MIS
systems and thus places no additional reporting requirements
on the operating forces. The data reflect direct and
indirect costs by weapon system, function and cost element
as well as providing detailed maintenance cost data. (Navy
VAMOSC Web Page, 1997)
The Navy VAMOSC database establishes a centralized
source of O&S cost data at the weapon system level.
However, it is limited in some respects. It lacks the
ability to track infrastructure costs, such as costs
associated with Base Operating Support (BOS) . There is
limited direct access to users and there is no direct link
to PPBS . A current effort is underway to re-engineer Navy
VAMOSC to capture the total cost of weapon systems. In FY
1997 the VAMOSC database was converted to a relational
database to make data available to authorized users on-line
and through client software packages. Additionally, NCCA is
investigating the possibilities of relating VAMOSC data to
the Future Years Defense Plan and PPBS. (NCCA, 1997)
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E. ARMY VAMOSC SYSTEM
1. Operating and Support Cost Management Infointiation
System
The key to the Army's VAMOSC system is the Operating
and Support Cost Management Information System (OSMIS)
database. Managed by the Army Cost and Economic Analysis
Center (CEAC) OSMIS gathers and records O&S cost information
on more that 4 00 Army Material Systems, including combat
vehicles, tactical vehicles, artillery systems, aircraft,
electronic systems and miscellaneous engineering systems
deployed in tactical units of the Army, National Guard and
Reserves. O&S information is made available to numerous
users throughout the defense community including Army and
DoD analysts, private contractors and other government
agencies. Reports are summarized at various levels from the
Major Command (MACOM) to the battalion level.
OSMIS was designed to support three communities: the
programming/budgeting community, the logistics community and
the acquisition community. For the programming/budgeting
community, OSMIS assists in the development of OPTEMPO
training budgets by providing input into the Army's Training
Resource Model and Flying Hour Program. For the Logistics
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community, OSMIS provides historical information which can
be used to support logistics models, build and validate
logistics budget documents, measure system rebuild and parts
usage rates, determine demand and costs of reparables,
consumables, training ammunition and petroleum, oil and
lubricant (POL), and monitor maintenance costs. For the
Acquisition community OSMIS is used for various program
assessments and analyses such as : Program Office Estimates
(POEs) , Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) , COEAs, design
cost tradeoffs, and cost reduction initiatives.
OSMIS tracks each weapon system by its Weapon
Identification Code (WIC) . Each system is assigned to a
battalion level unit by its Unit Identification Code (UIC)
and further identified by the Major Command that unit
reports to by a two digit MACOM code. Units may also be
grouped into division or non-divisional organizations and
identified by Troop Sequence Number (TPSN) . Sub-systems or
major end items are tracked for each OSMIS Weapon System by
the National Item Identification Number (NUN) in the
national supply inventory.
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Historical O&S data are reported in Annual Cost Reports
produced from the OSMIS database. The cost reports include
the information on consumption rates and costs of POL,
training ammunition, repair parts and components, depot and
intermediate maintenance costs and labor hours and
activity/OPTEMPO (miles/flying hours)
.
The Annual Cost Reports consists of seven volumes: (1)
Aviation Systems (rotary and fixed wing) ; (2) Combat Systems
(tanks and combat vehicles) ; (3) Artillery/Missile Systems
(artillery weapons and support vehicles, surface to surface
missiles and detection systems); (4) Tactical Systems
(wheeled vehicles) ; (5) Engineer/Construction Systems
(engineer, construction, electrical power generators, and
floating equipment); (6a) Communications/Electronics Systems
(radio receivers, teletypewriters, terminal sets, switches,
etc.); and (6b) Communications/Electronics Systems
(communications and data processing systems, radar sets,
terminals, etc.) . Annual Cost Reports for FY 1995 and FY
1996 are available for download as a Portable Document
Format (PDF) file and Excel spreadsheets via the WWW. (Army
VAMOSC Web Page, 19 97)
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2 . Tracking OPTEMPO
A universally recognized cost driver in the Army is
OPTEMPO miles^. These figures are critical to defining
readiness for the Army and have been used continuously in
Congressional Testimony for that very reason (Williams,
1994) . OPTEMPO is the pace of unit training activity that
the Army believes it needs to conduct in order to maintain
prescribed levels of readiness. OPTEMPO funds cover the
cost of fuel, reparable spare parts and consumable spare
parts. (GAO/NSIAD-97-222)
.
Tracking OPTEMPO accurately is critical to the
effective utilization of resources to meet specified levels
of readiness. The OSMIS database records OPTEMPO as well as
O&S cost data which allows users of the information to
relate O&S costs to executed OPTEMPO (miles driven)
.
Currently the Army CEAC tracks OPTEMPO mileage for
ground combat systems utilizing the Unit Level Logistics
System for Ground equipment (ULLS-G) . All ground units
report their mileage monthly using this system. Senior Army
leadership receives quarterly reports of OPTEMPO (Mileage)
An OPTEMPO mile is defined as every vehicle in the fleet traveling one mile.
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totals which are used for budget reviews and computing
OPTEMPO costs for the Planning Programming Budgeting
Execution System (PPBES) . (OPTEMPO Mileage, 1995 )
Each time a vehicle is operated its ending mileage is
entered into a ULLS computer when it is returned to the
motor pool. Not only can this information be rolled up and
used at higher echelons for budgeting and planning issues,
but it can also be used at the battalion level to determine
whether or not they are operating in accordance with their
allowable budgets or determine the impact additional
training will have on budgetary resources.
Incorporating OPTEMPO data into OSMIS is critical to
many applications of OSMIS database. Specifically, it is a
major contributing factor to establishing cost factors and
developing training budgets. The primary goal of OSMIS is
to develop a cost factor for each system it reports on.
Cost factors are based on miles for ground vehicles equipped
with odometers, flight hours for aircraft and number of
systems for most other systems. This enables OSMIS to be
linked, although crudely, to readiness. This creates an
opportunity to identify the critical cost factors that are
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closely associated with readiness. Without OPTEMPO, OSMIS




This chapter introduced the reader to the DoD Wide
VAMOSC program. It began with the definition of O&S costs
followed by a discussion of historical trends and elements
of OEcS spending. Next, it provided a brief history of DoD's
VAMOSC Program followed by a summary of each Service's
VAMOSC system. In the next chapter the core of the VAMOSC
system for USMC ground combat equipment, the Marine
Operating and Support Information System (MOSIS) , will be
introduced. The focus of that chapter will be an in-depth
look at the MOSIS database and the FY 1996 Marine Corps
Ground Combat Systems Report
.
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IV. MARINE OPERATING AND SUPPORT INFORMATION SYSTEM
A. OVERVIEW
Marine aircraft have been included in Navy VAMOSC for
twenty years, but until recently ground combat systems have
been largely ignored. When the NCCA was made responsible
for Navy VAMOSC, they began to expand the program to cover
additional areas of interest. During the 1992/1993 CAIG
reviews, the Secretary of the Navy directed NCCA to collect
USMC O&S information for its ground combat equipment
(Freeman, 1997) .
In order to integrate USMC ground combat systems into
Navy VAMOSC, NCCA, along with support contractors and the
Marine Corps, developed the Marine Operating and Support
Information System (MOSIS) . MOSIS was designed to
supplement current MIS used within the Marine Corps . It
gathers and records historical O&S cost data for selected
ground combat weapon systems. Currently, the MOSIS data
base contains data on organizational and intermediate
maintenance activities, parts cost, and maintenance labor
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hours for both military and civilian personnel. (FY 96 Cost
Report, 1997)
Early in FY 1992, Information Spectrum, Inc. (ISI), the
prime contractor responsible for the development and
operation of Navy VAMOSC, and Calibre Systems, Inc. 9,
subcontractor to ISA, were tasked with developing a list of
candidate USMC weapon systems for inclusion in Navy VAMOSC.
ISI and Calibre compared the similarities and differences of
USMC weapon systems to Army and Navy systems currently
reported upon by existing VAMOSC systems. Since USMC
aircraft and airborne weapon systems have been included in
the current Navy VAMOSC system, this analysis focused solely
on ground systems. (Flynn, 1992) .
The following criteria were established to determine
whether or not a specific weapon system should be included
in MOSIS:
• The weapon system is considered combat essential
equipment
.
^ Calibre Systems, Inc. played a key role in the development and operation of
the Army's VAMOSC system, OSMIS.
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• The weapon system qualifies as a reportable item and is
in current use in operational units.
• The weapon system is of substantial value (generally
defined as meeting DoD requirements for ACAT I or II
programs) ^° .
• The weapon system is fielded in such quantities that
its O&S costs are of interest to operational and fiscal
agencies
.
The 5 Ton Series Truck, all variants of the Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAV) , all variants of the Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV) , the MIOIAI and M198 artillery systems, the
MlAl and M60 Tanks and the tank recovery vehicle met at
least one of the above requirements. In addition, 72 other
communications, electronic and ordnance systems were
identified for possible consideration. (Flynn, 1992)
The Deputy Chief of Staff of Installations and
Logistics (DCS(IScL)), in close coordination with ISI and
Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) programs are MDAPs that require eventual
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $355
million (FY 1996 constant dollars) or procurement of more than $2,135 Billion
(in FY 1996 constant dollars) . ACAT II programs are major systems that require
eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more
than $140M (in FY 1996 constant dollars) or procurement of more that $645
million (in FY 1996 constant dollars). (DOD 5000. 2-R).
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Calibre, selected the 5 Ton Truck series and the LAVs for a
pilot program to develop MOSIS. The result of this program
was the development of the Marine Corps Operating and
Support FY 1994 Cost Report. Included in this report were
information on 5 Ton Trucks and LAVs associated parts costs,
maintenance labor hours and cumulative fiscal data from FY
1992 through FY 1994. The pilot program was limited to
organizational and intermediate maintenance costs because of
funding constraints. The final Cost Report was submitted to
NCCA and incorporated into Navy VAMOSC.
Following the successful completion of this pilot
program, DCSd&L) directed the expansion of the MOSIS
process. He mandated that the FY 1995 Cost Report include
O&S data on the artillery systems, the AAVs and the MlAl
tank. In addition, he encouraged increased distribution of
future cost reports to field commanders. (FY 96 Cost Report,
1997)
B. CAPABILITIES AND BENEFITS
MOSIS and the Fiscal Year Cost Reports provide DoN,
HQMC, Marine Corps Field Commanders, other managers, private
contractors and government agencies with a useful tool for
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monitoring historical O&S costs and related maintenance
information for major weapon systems. The data contained
within these reports will contribute to developing and
justifying annual budgets for field commanders, provide
independent cost estimates to acquisition program managers
to help justify development of a replacement weapon system,
provide a mechanism to analyze maintenance structures,
identify various consumption rates and assess funding of a
new weapon system versus the continued support of current
systems
.
The MOSIS database can be accessed to customize data to
meet a variety of needs relating to specific weapon systems
or groups of systems, fiscal year(s) or organize information
by unit from the Battalion to the MEF level.
C. DATA COLLECTION
By design, MOSIS uses Marine Corps standard MIS. There
are no additional hardware or software requirements, nor
special field programming needs (NCCA, 1996) . This
eliminates the possibility of hindering the operating forces
with any additional reporting requirements. To further
alleviate reporting responsibility from the MARFORs, MOSIS
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collects its data from the highest possible organizational
level. The majority of the collection effort is focused on
standard USMC information systems located at the Marine
Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) in Albany, Georgia.
The preponderance of the information incorporated into
the MOSIS database is drawn from historical records
maintained within the Asset Tracking for Logistics and
Supply Systems II (ATLASS II) . Simply defined, ATLASS II is
an integrated MIS that provides the interface of maintenance
management, readiness reporting, additional classes of
supply and appropriate MAGTF Logistics Automated Information
Systems (UM-4400-71)
.
The Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management
System (MIMMS) , a subsystem of ATLASS II, is an automated
information system that provides for the effective
maintenance production and practices through the management
of resources, training procedures and technical
documentation (UM-P4790-5) . MIMMS provides MOSIS with
material consumption data by National Stock Number (NSN) and
level of maintenance activity (depot, intermediate.
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organizational), labor hours and information on Equipment
Repair Orders (ERO)
.
D. FY 19 96 COST REPORT
The MOSIS FY 1996 Cost Report contains individual
reports on the series of 5 ton trucks, towed artillery
pieces, the family of AAVs , the family of LAVs and the MlAl
tank. Each weapon system is accounted for by Table of
Authorized Material Control Number (TAMCN) which identifies
the type and technical category of the system, its assigned
item number and its major classification and sub-
classification of supply. The Cost Report is organized in
TAMCN sequence where each variant of a weapon system is
identified by a specific TAMCN and reported on individually.
Table 4.1 contains a list of the weapon systems selected for









































Cargo, Dropside, W/out Winch
Cargo, Dropside, With Winch
Cargo, Dropside, W/out Winch
Cargo, Dropside, With Winch
Cargo, Dropside, XLWB, With Winch
Cargo, Dropside, XLWB, W/out Winch




Tractor, With Winch, With Equipment
Tractor, W/out Winch
Wrecker, With Winch, With Equipment
Wrecker, With Winch, With Equipment
Artillery
TAMCN NSN Model Nomenclature
E0640 VIIM 1015003229752 MIOIAI Howitzer, Light, Towed, 105MM
E0665 VIIM 1025010266648 M198 Howitzer, Medium, Towed, 155MM
Assault Amphibious
Vehicles (AAVs)
TAMCN NSN Model Nomenclature
E0796 VIIK 2350010809087 AAVC7A1 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Command
E0846 VIIK 2350010818138 AAVPPAl Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Personnel




















LAV-AT Light Armored Vehicle, Anti-tank
LAV-C2 Light Armored Vehicle, Command and Control
LAV-25 Light Armored Vehicle, Light Assault, 25MM
LAV-L Light Armored Vehicle, Logistics
LAV-M Light Armored Vehicle, Mortar
LAV-R Light Armored Vehicle, Maintenance/Recovery
Model Nomenclature
MlAl Tank, Combat, Full Tracked, 120MM Gun
Table 4 . 1 Selected Ground Combat Systems
From Appendix B, FY 1996 Cost Report
Each individual system report begins with a narrative
description of the system and a weapon system models and
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components list^^. Following the system description are
eight separate reports. Each report displays Marine Corps
wide totals, Command totals (I MEF, II MEF, III MEF,
Reserves and Prepositioning Forces) and Major Subordinate
Command (MSC) totals (CE, MEU, GCE, ACE, CSSE) . Each of the
eight reports is described briefly.
FY 96 Summary Data Report . This report gives an
overview of O&S costs and other pertinent information about
the weapon system. It includes information extracted from
the other seven reports.
FY 96 Parts Cost Per System Report . This report
displays the average annual parts cost per system at the
organizational and intermediate maintenance levels as well
as total parts cost for each Command and MSC^^
.
Average Annual Parts Cost Report . This report displays
the total parts cost for each Command and MSC for a five
year period. The average annual parts costs are determined
Multiple models of a particular weapon system may be included under a single
TAMCN.
-1 o
Parts costs are calculated by multiplying NSN parts quantities recorded on
completed maintenance EROs, as reported in MIMMS, by corresponding standard unit
prices for consumables or by exchange or special unit prices for reparables.
The sums provided are in "then year dollars"
.
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by dividing total parts cost by the number of years data
were collected^^ _
FY 96 Maintenance Labor Hours Report . This report
displays organizational and intermediate level maintenance
labor hours and total labor hours for each Command and MSC.
Average annual labor hours per weapon system are computed by
dividing total labor hours by the number of weapon systems
within a particular Command or MSC.
Average Annual Labor Hours Report . This report
displays total maintenance labor hours for each Command and
MSC for a five year period. Average annual labor hours are
determined by dividing the sum total of labor hours by the
number of years data were collected.
FY 96 Equipment Repair Order Costs Report . This report
displays organizational and intermediate maintenance level
ERO parts costs^^ and total ERO parts cost for each Command
and MSC. The average annual parts cost per ERO is
calculated by dividing the total ERO parts cost (includes
13 For some systems data may not have been available for the full five years,




both organizational and intermediate ERO parts cost) by the
number of EROs submitted by a particular Command or MSC.
Averacre Equipment Repair Order Costs Report . This
report displays ERO parts cost for each Command and MSC for
a five year period. Average ERO costs are calculated by
dividing the total ERO parts costs (the summation of parts
costs for the number of years data were collected) by the
number of years data was collected.
Top 100 National Stock Number Cost Drivers Report
.
This report lists the top 100 repair parts, both reparable
and consumable, used by a particular weapon system. Items
are displayed by NSN and listed in descending order by
extended cost (quantity used multiplied by the unit price)
.
E. LIMITATIONS
MOSIS is not nearly as elaborate or complete as the
systems used by the other Services and is limited in many
respects. Most notable are the limited number of systems
MOSIS tracks, the limited data presented in the Fiscal Year
Cost Reports, the inability to track OPTEMPO measurements,
limited user accessibility and the inability to track
indirect support cost elements.
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Currently, MOSIS reports on 26 different models and
types of ground combat systems. Compared to the Army's
OSMIS system which tracks approximately 400 different
tactical systems, MOSIS is not nearly as well developed. In
addition, data in the most recent cost report are limited to
organizational and intermediate level maintenance parts cost
and labor hours. In contrast to OSMIS there are no data on
depot level maintenance, including depot level reparables
(replenishment spares) , and unit level consumption of
training ammunition and POL. Table 4.2 summarizes the O&S
Cost Elements and other categories included in the OSMIS and
MOSIS Cost Reports.
MOSIS does not track OPTEMPO or other measures of unit
activity. This, in part, is because the individuals
responsible for collecting and recording MOSIS data are not
authorized to impose reporting requirements on the MARFORs
(Freeman, 1997) (Lucero, 1997) and in part because current
Marine Corps MIS do not accurately track or record specific
measures of OPTEMPO (e.g., miles driven) (Carroll, 1997).
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O&S COST ELEMENT OSMIS MOSIS
MISSION PERSONNEL
Operations
Organizational Maintenance Labor Hours •
UNIT LEVEL CONSUMPTION
POL Consumption/Cost /
Training Ammunition Consumption/Cost •
Consumable Material/Repair Parts Cost • •
Depot Level Reparables •
INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
Maintenance Labor Costs /
Maintenance Labor Hours • •
Consumable Materials/Repair Parts Cost • •
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
Rebuild/Overhaul •
Maintenance Labor Costs •




Rebuild/Overhaul Cost Drivers •
Repair Cost Drivers •
OTHER CATEGORIES
OPTEMPO Miles •
Top Consumable Cost Drivers • •
Top Reparable Cost Drivers • •
Table 4.2 Comparison of OSMIS and MOSIS O&S Cost Elements
Finally, neither MOSIS nor OSMIS collects data on BOS,
installation support or other indirect support costs
elements This research was unable to confirm any
significant efforts to include such information in MOSIS or
OSMIS in the near future.
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F. FUTURE OUTLOOK
1. Future Data Collection Plan
According to the FY 1996 Cost Report MOSIS is capable
of expanding to accommodate an ever increasing number of
cost elements associated with the utilization of fielded
major end items. The future data collection plan will
concentrate on gathering data on ammunition costs, depot
level maintenance costs, maintenance personnel labor costs
and POL costs. Each of these costs elements will be drawn
from Marine Corps standard data systems where the
information is relatable to specific TAMCNs
.
There are also plans to incorporate additional systems
into MOSIS and future Cost Reports. The MOSIS team has
started collecting information and data for the M220A2 Tube-
launched, Optically guided, Wire command linked (TOW) anti-
armor missile system, the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
(AVLB) , the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) , the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV) and
miscellaneous engineering and communications assets.
(Freeman, 19 97)
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We were unable to confirm any significant progress in
or future plans to begin collecting and incorporating
OPTEMPO data into the MOSIS database. Additionally, neither
MOSIS nor OSMIS
2. User Accessibility
Currently, Fiscal Year Cost Reports are available
through NCCA. However, direct access to MOSIS, the ability
to obtain data in electronic format or specifically
structure data to meet special end user needs are limited.
The NCCA converted Navy VAMOSC (which includes MOSIS) to
relational database format in FY 1997 and is in the process
of making the data available to authorized users on line and
through the use of client software.
Navy VAMOSC data are maintained in Oracle Relational
Database Management System (RDBMS) in a database warehouse.
Data may be retrieved using a Commercial-of -the-Shelf (COTS)
software package called Business Objects. Business Objects
is a Windows based. Graphical User Interface (GUI) on-line
analysis process tool from which reports can be created that




This chapter introduced the reader to the Marine
Operating and Support Information System. It began with a
discussion of the development of MOSIS followed by a brief
description of its capabilities, benefits and data sources.
Next it described the main output of MOSIS, the FY 1996 Cost
Report and compared MOSIS O&S Cost Elements with the Army's
OSMIS Cost Elements. The chapter concluded with a
discussion of the limitations of MOSIS in its current state
and future plans for expanding its capability. The next
chapter concludes this thesis with recommendations and areas
for further research.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. DISCUSSION
This thesis focused on presenting the resources-to-
readiness issues for DoD in general and the Marine Corps in
particular. The previous chapters describe the Marine Corps
Operating Forces, budgeting for those forces, the ways in
which the Marine Corps currently monitors readiness for
those forces and the difficulties associated with their
methodology. Finally, a cost analysis tool for DoD, the
VAMOSC Program, was introduced as a possible mechanism for
analyzing OScS cost data to relate resources to readiness.
Relating budgetary resources to readiness continues to
be a perplexing problem throughout DoD. Coupled with the
recent downsizing efforts and increased fiscal constraints.
Marine Corps activity managers continue to struggle in their
efforts to formulate and justify O&M budgets based on
quantitative measures of performance or indicators of
readiness. Currently the Marine Corps evaluates readiness
using a variety of methods, but there still continues to be
a need for a good indicator of activity, OPTEMPO or
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readiness that can define a distinct relationship to O&M
budgets
.
The RBB system has been described as one effort to link
readiness to budgeting. It justifies financial requirements
by demonstrating a distinct connection between readiness and
fiscal resources. While this system has worked well for the
Marine Divisions, it is too narrowly focused to be applied
to the Marine Corps as a whole
.
DoD's VAMOSC Program is one mechanism that provides
detailed cost data that may be useful in examining the
resources-to-readiness problem. The Army, Navy and Air
Force VAMOSC systems collect and record O&S cost data and
relate it to specific measures of OPTEMPO, e.g., cost per
mile driven, cost per steaming hour and cost per flying
hour. The Army's OSMIS system in particular has been
extremely useful in developing cost factors that are applied
to the planning, programming, and budgeting process.
Marine Corps ground combat systems have been
incorporated into the Navy VAMOSC system using the MOSIS
database. MOSIS is still in the early stage of development
and is limited in the data it collects and their
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accessibility to end users. Also, little effort has been
made to incorporate OPTEMPO data into the system. This
makes it extremely difficult to define cost factors that can
be effective in the formulation and justification of
budgets. However, as MOSIS matures, and data on more weapon
systems and more O&S cost elements become available, its
capacity for cost analysis will increase greatly.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
The single most limiting factor of MOSIS as an
analytical tool for better understanding the resources-to-
readiness problem is the lack of accurate and reliable
measures of OPTEMPO. To enhance the usefulness of the MOSIS
database and its contribution to cost analysis OPTEMPO data
must be incorporated into the system. It is recommended
that the Marine Corps utilize existing MIS to record OPTEMPO
data for systems currently reported on in MOSIS.
Additionally, steps need to be taken to ensure that as new
systems are incorporated into MOSIS techniques for recording
levels of activity are developed. This includes recording
miles driven or operating hours and POL consumption for
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vehicles, ammunition consumption for weapons, battery usage
for communications equipment, and so on.
Another limiting factor for using MOSIS in cost
analysis is the relatively few combat systems and O&S cost
elements it reports on. It is further recommended that the
developers of MOSIS continue to include additional systems
and cost elements in MOSIS. Particularly, unit level
consumption and depot level maintenance data should be
collected.
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. Broad Level Analysis
An analytical approach to predicting readiness based on
deployment patterns, SORTS ratings, personnel issues, etc.,
may provide a means to better understand the relationship
between readiness and resources, exercise and deployments in
the Marine Corps. A good starting point for this research
would be CNA Research Memorandum 97-51, Measuring and
Predicting Readiness: Final Report, June 1997.
2. Micro-level Analysis
In the near future the MOSIS database will be
accessible through the use of client software available at
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the Naval Postgraduate School computer laboratories. This
will allow researchers to structure data to their particular
analytical requirements.
Once OPTEMPO data becomes available it would be
possible to use MOSIS data to: (1) predict consumption rates
(maintenance labor hours, parts usage, fuel consumption,
etc.) based on OPTEMPO; and (2) determine the operational
cost per mile/hour of a particular weapon system and develop
cost factors that could be used to cost out exercises,
develop budgets and justify budget level changes.
Currently, efforts are underway to collect OPTEMPO
mileage data on all Light Armored Infantry Battalions in the
Marine Corps. This creates an opportunity to conduct the
above analysis for the LAV and relate it to specific Marine
Corps units. This will also provide a means to demonstrate
the potential of the MOSIS database.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAV Assault Amphibious Vehicle
ACAT Acquisition Category
ACE Aviation Combat Element
ADP Automated Data Processing
AG Activity Group
AIS Automated Information System
ARG Amphibious Ready Group
ATLASS II Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System
AVLB Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
BA Budget Activity
BES Budget Estimate Submission
BFTD Battalion Field Training Day
BOS Base Operating Support
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CAX Combined Arms Exercise
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CE Command Element
CEAC Cost and Economic Analysis Center
CER Cost Estimating Relationships
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CINC Commander in Chief
CJCS Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNA Center for Naval Analysis
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
CONUS Continental United States
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
CSCS Component Support Cost Sub- system
CSSE Combat Service Support Element
CUCV Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle
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GAO General Accounting Office
GCE Ground Combat Element
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMMWV Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HQMC Headquarters United States Marine Corps
IDA Institute for Defense Analysis
ISI Information Spectrum, Inc
ITS Individual Training Standards
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LAV Light Armored Vehicle
MACOM Major Command
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARDIV Marine Division
MARFORs Marine Operating Forces
MAW Marine Air Wing
MBO Management By Objectives
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCCRES Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System
MCLB Marine Corps Logistics Base
MCS Maintenance Cost System
MCTEEP Marine Corps Training Exercise and Employment Plan
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MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program
MDS Mission Design Series
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
METL Mission Essential Task List
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIMMS Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management
System
MIS Management Information System
MPS Mission Performance Standards
MOSIS Marine Operating and Support Cost Information
System
MSC Major Subordinate Command
MSSG MEU Service Support Group
MlAl Abrams Tank
NCCA Naval Center for Cost Analysis
NUN National Item Identification Number
NSN National Stock Number
0MB Office of Management and Budget
OScM,MC Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
OScM,N Operations and Maintenance, Navy
O&S Operating and Support
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OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSMIS
PDF





















Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant
Program Objectives Memorandum
Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System
Planning Programming and Budgeting System
Requirements Based Budgeting
Relational Database Management System
Standard Accounting Budgeting and Reporting System
Sub-activity Group
Secretary of Defesne
Status of Resources and Training Systems
Temporary Additional Duty





UDP Unit Deployment Program
UIC Unit Identification Number
ULLS Unit Level Logistics System
ULLS-G Unit Level Logistics System Ground
USD(A&:T) Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition and
Technology
USMC United States Marine Corps
VAMOH Visibility and Management Overhead
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support
Costs
WIC Weapon Identification Code
WUC Work Unit Code
WSSC Weapon System Support Cost
WWW World Wide Web
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